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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DEBORAH LYNNE CONNOR,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 950443-CA

vs.
MARK STEVEN COOK,
Defendant/Appellee.

Priority
Classification #16
JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated §78-2A-3(2)(i) (1995 as amended).
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is taken from a final Order entered by the Honorable
Judge Frank G. Noel, Third Judicial District Court, on June 9, 1995,
Case No. 929900107MI..

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering Appellant to
pay 1/2 of the reasonable job-related daycare expenses when Appellant's
monthly income is $342.00 from AFDC for another child and when daycare
expenses are approximately $250.00 per month?

PSTEPMINftTIVE STATUTES

Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7.5 (1994 as amended).

Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-38 ( \)

(1995* as amended).

Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7.17, 7.18 (1995"as amended).

Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7(3) (1994 as amended).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Proceedings Below

The parties were divorced pursuant to a Decree of Divorce entered
in the Montana Thirteenth Judicial District Court on August 7, 1990.
Defendant/Appellee was awarded custody of the minor child RYAN COOK, and
also it was ordered that Plaintiff/Appellant was not to pay child
support or other costs of the minor child. On March 13, 1993,
Plaintiff/Appellant filed her Petition to Modify and Motion for Order to
Show Cause, in the Utah Third Judicial District Court, asking the Court
to grant her extended visitation through her Order to Show Cause and a
change of custody

through her Petition to Modify.

Defendant/Appellee filed a Motion to Dismiss.

On March 19, 1995,

Defendant/Appellee did

file a Counterpetition to Modify for a change in child support.

On

June 9, 1995, an Order was entered ordering Plaintiff/Appellant to pay
one half of the daycare expenses of the minor child of the parties RYAN
COOK.

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below
Pursuant to the telephone conference of April 27th and the income
verification submitted, Honorable Frank G. Noel ordered that
Plaintiff/Appellant pay to Appellee one half of the daycare expenses of
the minor child RYAN COOK. Plaintiff/Appellant had not stipulated to
this bur there was

(X Petition filed and properly before the Court for

this relief.

4

STATEMENT QF FACTS
At the hearing on March 23, 1995, evidence was submitted to the
trial court that: the only present source of income for
Plaintiff/Appellee was ADFC, in the amount of $342.00 per month, for a
child other than the minor child of the parties; that her total income
from all other sources in 1994 was $3,751.57, or an average of $312.63
per month; and that Defendant/Appellee1s income is $2,502.33 per month.
In the telephone conference of May 23, 1995, evidence was presented by
proffer of counsel that

Defendant/Appellee's daycare expense for the

minor child was $250.00 per month.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court abused its discretion by not entering findings of
voluntary underemployment of the Appellant and of substantial change in
circumstances to support its financial determination that Appellant
should pay $125.00 per month in daycare expenses for the minor child.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY NOT ENTERING FINDINGS TO

SUPPORT ITS FINANCIAL DETERMINATIONS.
It is settled in Utah that a divorce court has considerable
discretion in adjusting financial and property interests of the parties,
and that the Court of Appeals will not disturb a Court f s decision unless
it is clearly unjust or a clear abuse of discretion.

Hall v. Hall, 858

P.2d 1018, 1019 (Utah App. 1993.; Gill v. Gill, 718 P.2d 779, 780 (Utah
1986).

Findings are adequate only if they are sufficiently detailed and

5

include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate decision on each factual issue was reached. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018
at 1021.
A.

The Lower Court failed to consider the constraints of Utah

Code Annotated 78-45-7.18(2) (1994 as amended).
Utah Code Annotated 78-40-7.17(1) provides as follows:
The need to include childcare costs in the child support order is
pres
umed if the custodial parent or the non-custodial parent
during extended visitation, is working and actual ly incurring
childcare costs.
Utah Code Annotated 78-45-7.18(2) provides as follows:
If the amount under either table as provided in Section 78-45-7.14
in combination with the award of medical expenses exceeds 50% of
the obligor's adjusted gross income, or by adding childcare costs,
total child support would exceed 50% of the obligor!s adjusted
gross income, the presumption under 78-45-7.17 is rebutted.
Utah Code Annotated 78-45-7.5(3)(a) specifically excludes all
income from Aid to Dependant Families and Children from the
determination of gross income. Only if the trial court properly imputed
historical income based upon 1994 earnings of average of $312.00 per
month, would Appellant's childcare obligation of $125.00 per month
earnings be slightly less than one half of her gross income. Thus, only
if said income were imputed through a finding of present voluntary
underemployment would the presumption of Utah Code Annotated 7 8-457.17(1) fail to be rebutted.
B.

The court failed to enter the necessary findings to impute

income to the Appellant.
The trial court never articulated that the Appellant was
voluntarily underemployed, or presented findings to that effect.
6

Where

the court details subsidiary findings of fact which underlie a finding
of underemployment, and which, by themselves, show the steps by which
the court arrived at its apparent conclusion that a parent is
underemployed under section 78-45-7.5(7) (a) , the court's decisions to
impute income will not be invalidated solely on the ground that the
"finding" was not couched in the exact language of the statute. Hall,
858 P.2d at 1025.

Because the findings in the instant case do not

include any findings to the effect that the Appellant was voluntarily
underemployed, they are statutorily insufficient. Id.
Although the Appellant did stipulate to a review of the financial
situations of the parties in deference to the needs of the minor child,
Appellant never stipulated to a finding that she was underemployed.

The

court may not impute income to a parent for the purpose of determining
the appropriate level of child support unless the parent stipulates to
that amount imputed or there is a hearing in which the finding is made
that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. Hill v.
Hill, 869 P.2d 963, 965 (Utah App. 1994).
In the instant case, the trial court must make a specific finding
of voluntary underemployment.
C.

The court: failed to enter the necessary findings to support a

significant change In circumstances.
There was cK petition or counterpetition before the Court for the
modification of supporthe court specifically reserved the issue of
child support and declined to order any child support amount based on a
material change in circumstances. Similarly, the Appellant did not
stipulate to a finding of a material change in circumstances to justify

7

a modification of the child support award. Thus, if as the court ruled
there was no justification for an increase in the base child support
award, then the court's only legal basis for imposing an additional
$125.00 per month in childcare obligation would be a finding that use of
the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best
interests of the child.
1994).

Brooks v. Brooks, 881 P.2d 955, 960 (Utah App.

In Brooks, the trial court declined to increase child support on

the basis that there was no material change in circumstances, but
increased the Appellant's child support obligation by ordering him to
pay $300.00 toward the private school fees.

On appeal, the Court ruled

that reversed and remanded for either the requisite findings of a
substantial change in circumstances or the vacation of the Order to pay
school expenses.
In the instant case, the trail court must make a specific finding
of material change in circumstance.
CONCLUSION
For all the reasons outlined above, the financial determinations
of the trial court should be remanded for specific findings of voluntary
underemployment and of a significant change in circumstances to warrant
a change in the child support obligation of Appellant.
DATED THIS 26th day of September, 1995.

rri L. Hill, Attorney for Appellant
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Cite as 881 P.2d 955 IL'tahApp. 1994)

^e providing to her daughter during the
pjghteen months of temporary custody. Ac,0rdingly, we believe that the trial court's
gndings are inadequate to support its award
0{ custody to Mr. Tucker.

stances1'; and (3) decision to grant ex-husband a credit for social security disability
benefits received by his daughter on account
of debtor's disability was one committed to
discretion of trial court

CONCLUSION

Affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part.

The trial court's findings of fact are inadequate to support its award of physical custody to Mr. Tucker. Accordingly, we reverse
and remand for further detailed findings on
this issue, consistent with the principles set
forth in our opinion.
BILLINGS and DAVIS, JJ., concur.

O

H>

| KEY NUMBER SYSTEM

1. Parent and Child <3=>3.3(8)
Rebuttable presumption exists, in proceeding to establish or modify child support
award, that amount of support indicated by
child support guidelines is proper support
award; to rebut that presumption, trial court
must make finding that use of guidelines
would be unjust, inappropriate or not in best
interest of child.
U.CJU953, 78-457.2(2)(a).
2. Parent and Child <S=>3.3(8)

Jo Ann BROOKS (Nunley), Plaintiff,
Appellee, and Cross-Appellant,
v.
Thomas M. BROOKS, Defendant,
Appellant, and CrossAppellee.
No. 920733-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Sept. 12, 1994.
Ex-wife filed petition for modification of
divorce decree to increase her ex-husband's
responsibility for child support and payment
of visitation expenses. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Richard H. Moffat,
J., entered order denying wife's petition for
increased support, but required husband to
pay one half of child's visitation expenses,
and both parties appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Billings, P.J., held that: (1) change
in parties' income was not, itself, "material
change in circumstances" warranting modification of husband's child support obligation;
(
2) case would be remanded to trial court for
determination as to whether any other factors constituted "material change in circum-

Child support modifications are proper
only when party seeking modification demonstrates material change in circumstances.
U.C.A.1953, 78-45-7(1 )(a), (2).
3. Divorce <2>309.2(3)
Change in parties' incomes from time
that they were granted divorce by California
trial court, consisting of a nearly 66% reduction in wife's net monthly income and a near
doubling of her ex-husband's income, was not
a "material change in circumstances" justifying modification of child support award
where, under Utah child support guidelines
applicable at modification proceeding, presumptive child support award differed by less
than 25% from that ordered in California
divorce action. U.CA1953, 78-45-7.2(6).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.

4. Parent and Child <s=>3.3(8)
Factors other than change in parties'
relative income can constitute a "material
change in circumstances" such as will permit
court, on modification petition, to reach issue
of whether deviation from child support
guidelines is now appropriate. U.CA1953,
78-45-7(l)(a), (2).
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5. Divorce <£=>312.7
Child support modification proceeding
would be remanded to trial court for determination as to whether factors other than
change in relative income of parties constituted a ''material change in circumstances,"
such as would support modification of husband's child support obligation. U.C.A.1953,
78-45-7(l)(a), (2).
6. Parent and Child <s=»3.3(8)
Child support award may not be retroactively increased beyond period during which
modification petition was pending. U.C.A1953, 30-3-10.6(2).
7. Parent and Child <S=>3.3(7)
Social Security and Public Welfare
<s=>139
Divorce court may, in its discretion, consider child's receipt of social security disability benefits and allow disabled parent credit
for those benefits against his or her child
support obligation; however, trial court may
not order that social security benefits be
subject to legal process.
8. Divorce <$=>303(2)
Modification of divorce court's order regarding payment of visitation expenses is
proper, when moving party demonstrates
substantial change in circumstances subsequent to entry of decree and not contemplated at that time.
9. Divorce <3=>312.6(6)
Court of Appeals reviews divorce court's
determination to modify order regarding allocation of visitation expenses for abuse of
discretion.
10. Divorce <2>303(2)
"Substantial change in circumstances"
existed regarding payment of visitation expenses, and trial court could properly require
husband to begin paying one half of such
expenses, where divorce court's prior determination that wife should bear all travelrelated expenses was based on wife's status
as airline employee, and wife no longer
worked for airline.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.

Paul H. Liapis and Kim M. Luhn, Salt
Lake City, for appellant.
Randall J. Holmgren, Salt Lake City, for
appellee.
Before BILLINGS, JACKSON and
ORxME, JJ.
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:
Thomas Brooks appeals from an order (1)
requiring him to pay one-half of prospective
private school costs for his daughter, one-half
of past private school expenses, and one-half
of past medical and dental expenses and (2)
refusing to allow him a credit for Social
Security benefits his daughter receives due
to his disability. His ex-wife, Jo Ann Nunley, cross-appeals, seeking an upward adjustment of child support and an order requiring
Brooks to pay the entire cost of visitation.
We affirm in part and reverse and remand in
part.
FACTS
Brooks and Nunley were divorced in Los
Angeles, California in 1985. Pursuant to the
decree of divorce, Brooks was ordered to pay
$300 per month in child support for their
daughter Michelle. Nunley was ordered to
pay for Michelle's transportation to and from
Los Angeles for visitation with Brooks. This
order was based in large part upon Nunley's
employment with TWA Airlines, which afforded her free or discounted air travel
Just after the divorce, Nunley moved to Salt
Lake City, and Brooks subsequently relocated to Montana.
In June 1988, Nunley filed a "Petition for
Modification of Foreign Divorce Decree."
She alleged a substantial change in circumstances necessitating a change in her obligation to pay the transportation costs of
Brooks's visitation with Michelle. Nunley
later filed an amended petition seeking anorder requiring Brooks to pay one-half of
Michelle's medical and dental expenses, onehalf of her private school tuition, and increased child support.

y-><
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The ca^e was tried in April 1991. Brooks
testified that at the time of the divorce he
had retired for medical reasons from the Los
.Angeles Police Department where he was
earning a net monthly income of $1600. In
addition, he testified that he nowT suffers
from numerous physical ailments, including
thyroid disease, an ulcer, and heart disease
and that as a result of his disability, he
presently receives a pension of $2332.26 per
T.unth plus $697 per month in Social Security
lability benefits. Nunley attempted to
demonstrate tnat Brooks's income exceeded
the $3029.26 per month he claimed. She
presented evidence that Brooks purchased a
$53,000 Ferrari in 1986 and that he deposited
$173,650.68 in a checking account between
May 1988 and July 1990.
Nunley testified that her employment with
TWA ceased in June 1989. At the time of
trial, Nunley was self-employed in a costume
business. She testified that she took no salary from 19S9 through 1991, except for $2000
in 1989 used to pay for Michelle's private
school tuition. Despite receiving no salary.
Nunley stipulated to an income of $833 per
month for the purposes of calculating child
-upport. Brooks claimed Nunley had access
to corporate income from her costume business.
At trial, the parties disagreed about Michelle's private school education. During the
marriage, Michelle attended private school in
California. However, Brooks claimed that
after the divorce, Nunley decided unilaterally
to send Michelle to private school in Utah,
never asking him to share the tuition costs
before filing her petition.1 Nunley claimed
she had understood that Brooks desired to
continue Michelle's private school education.
In fact, in an Order to Show Cause proceeding initiated by Brooks in California, he
threatened to seek custody of Michelle in
part because Nunley had withdrawn her
from the private school she was then attending.
On April 26, 1991, the trial court signed a
minute entry. Although stating that neither
party had accurately revealed his or her
1. Michelle attended a private pre-school in California. The California decree did not impose
any obligation on Brooks, in addition to his

V ' -»*4i
, A that Nunley s
•" ' V the court condudedt**
^
income, tne
-around $9^* *** . A
montnlymcomew*>£»»
^
d e m ed
Brooks's was *®ffnaeaaed
child support,
Nunle/s request ^ ^ ^ n u a l change
finding there ^
X Utah's child support
in circumstances under
guidelines.
. the court
With respect to travel e ^ s . ^
m
found there had been a s u b s t " ^ ^ o f
circumstances warran g
^
h
the decree. The couu
and
N u n l ev « , no ' - ^ ^ c o u n t e d air
therefore no longer entitled to OB,
^
travel, and because *"f%X*Wto
to
Angeles to M o n t a n a * " £ £ ^ should
S ^ ^ S ^ S K - ordered the
p X t share equally the visitation costs.
Further, the court found that both parties
wished Michelle to remain in private school
Therefore, the court ordered the parties to
share equally the costs of tuition, books, supplies, school activities, and uniforms, but not
extracurricular activities. Brooks was also
ordered to pay one-half of Michelle's past
private school expenses.
Initially, the court credited Brooks with
the amounts of Social Security benefits paid
to Nunley on behalf of Michelle by reason of
his disability and directed him to pay any
deficiency on a monthly basis. However,
Nunley subsequently filed a "Motion for
Clarification of Ruling and for In-Camera
Interview," and after numerous motions, the.
court vacated its April 26, 1991 ruling granting Brooks the credit. The court ruled instead that, pursuant to an accounting by the
parties, Brooks owed $8312.75 for one-half
the private school tuition and costs, $578.62
for one-half the medical and dental expenses,
and $2900.69 for uniforms, activities, and
supplies. On October 22, 1992, over the objection of Brooks, the court entered findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and an order
modifying the decree of divorce. The court
1toNmUeyfahe
theamount
of
$11,792.06
and
denied
Brooks
th- G ^ - T ' C — ^>»™ OFOOKS credit for
the Social Security benefits Michelle re-
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education. However w L „ ' S P ™
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eeives. Brooks appeals from this order, and
Nuniey cross-appeals.
I. CHILD SUPPORT
A. Private School Fees and
Increased Child Support
On appeal, Brooks asserts that the trial
court abused its discretion in modifying the
divorce decree by requiring him to pay onehalf of Michelle's private school costs and in
entering judgment for one-hall" of previously
incurred private school costs. Nuniey crossappeals, contending that the trial court
abused its discretion in failing t- increase
Brooks's basic child support contributions.
[1,2] Under Utah's statutory child support scheme, the trial court is to apply the
child support guidelines as a rebuttable presumption in establishing or modifying the
amount of temporary or permanent child
support. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2(2)(a)
(Supp.1994). "In order to rebut this statutory presumption, the trial court must make a
finding that use of the guidelines would be
unjust, inappropriate or not in the best interest of the child." Hill v. Hill 841 P.2d 722,
724 (Utah App.1992) (citing Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-45-7.2(3) (1992)). Furthermore, child
support modifications are proper only when
the party seeking modification demonstrates
a material change in circumstances. Utah
Code Ann. § 78-45-7(1 )(a), (2) (Supp.1994);
Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 1297,
1299 (Utah 1981). Moreover, section 7&-457.2 of the Utah Code defines material change
of circumstances with mathematical precision, and contemplates a modification or adjustment when "there is a difference of at
least 25% between the existing [child support] order and the guidelines." Utah Code
Ann. § 78-45-7.2(6) (Supp.1994).
In the instant case, the trial court concluded that no substantial and material change in
circumstances had occurred with respect to
the child support calculation. To support
that determination, the court made the following findings:
5. The Court finds that the Defendant,
THOMAS M. BROOKS, has a current
gross income of $3,029.26 per month. The
Court bases this finding on all of the evi-

dence submitted at trial, including the e\ Idence that his disability and social security
income is tax-free, and including his income producing capabilities, and the Court
believes that the finding is based on due
consideration of all of the evidence.
6. The Court finds that the income of
the Plaintiff is approximately $10,000.00
per year (or about $833.00 per month),
based upon the stipulated testimony of the
Plaintiff at trial, and the Court finds that
her imputed income should be approximately $833.00 per month. The Court did
not find evidence to support a finding that
Plaintiff was earning more than her stipulated income of $10,000 per year.
7. The Court finds that there has not
been a substantial and material change of
circumstances based upon its finding that
Plaintiff has a minimum of $833.00 gross
per month from her costume business, and
further that she earned a profit of approximately $4,493.00 for the tax year 1990
from her costume business, that she had
incorporated into her tax return a rental
write-off of $5,400.00 while operating this
business out of her home, and that the
Plaintiff had the ability to write-off substantial amounts of expenses through her
business, without being required to take
money from the business in a taxable form.
The Court finds that the Defendant claims
a $400.00 per month expenditure to maintain his Ferrari automobile and that the'
total of Defendants checking account deposits for the period May 16, 1988 through
July 17, 1990, shows approximately $173,000.00 of deposits and $171,000.00 of withdrawals. While there are certain explanations made which could explain some of the
discrepancy, it certainly did not describe
or explain away all of the discrepancy as to
the Defendant's expenditures.
9. The Court is of the opinion that the
exhibits and testimony produced by both
parties at the time of the trial do not fully
reveal the nature and extent of their re-,
spective incomes and, therefore, the Court
cannot draw any more specific findings
from the evidence presented at the time of
the trial as to either party's income.

Cite as 881 P.2d *55 I lah \pp. 1^4)

10. The Court tlnds from che evidence
presented and its additional findings sec
forth above, that Plaintiff and Defendant
clearly have additional income which the
Court has not been able to compute and
arrive at a figure for each party. The
Court's best judgment is that it is at a
level which does not justify a finding of a
substantial change of material circumstances and, therefore, the child support
sum of $300.00 per month should be left in
place, particularly in view of the Defendant's willingness to keep the child support
at its current level of $300.00 per month.
18. The Court finds that the Plaintiff
has enrolled the minor child in a private
school, Rowland-Hall St. Mark's, and that
she has expended substantial sums of money to keep said child in a private school.
The Court further finds that both Plaintiff
and Defendant are desirous for their child
to be enrolled in private school The
Court finds that the Defendant noted that
he did not believe that he had the ability to
maintain the costs to maintain the minor
child in private school.
19. The Court finds that Plaintiff and
Defendant should pay one-half of the private school tuition, books, supplies, school
activities, and school uniforms from the
date of Plaintiffs Amended Petition, November 21, 1988, when this issue was first
raised by Plaintiff, until the child ceases to
2. This is one of the incongruities that occurs
when child support is set under different guidelines in different states. What appears to be a
change in circumstances does not qualify as such
because Utah's guidelines are comparatively low,
causing a different result than would occur under the California system. Comparing the child
support levels for the relevant combined parental
income figure. Utah's guidelines produce a child
support amount in the bottom 20% of all states,
while California's guidelines yield a figure in the
top 60% nationwide. See Maureen A. PirogGood, Child Support Guidelines and the Economic Well-Being of Children in the United States, 42
Family Relations 453, 459-60 (1993).
3. The trial court did not characterize the award
of private school costs, but treated it as an award
separate from child support. However, we believe the private school costs are part and parcel
of the child support award and have found no
authoritv to the contrary.

attend private school or until further order
of this Court.
[3] With respect to income figures, the
court found that at the time of the divorce.
Brooks had a net income of $1600 per month,
and Nunley had a net monthly income of
$2390.60. These figures compare with
$3029.26 and $833, respectively, at the time
of the modification trial. When viewed in the
abstract, these figures suggest a substantial
change in circumstances in that Nunley's income has dramatically decreased, while
Brooks's income has almost doubled. However, the relevant inquiry focuses on whether
there has been material change in relation to
the child support guidelines, such that the
original awrard is no longer consistent with
these guidelines.
Under the Utah guidelines applicable at
the time of trial, Brooks's child support obligation was by our calculations near $300.00
per month.2 Thus, the trial court properly
found there had been no material change
warranting an increase in support occasioned
by the change in the parties' relative incomes.
However, the determination that Brooks
should pay one-half of the private school
costs, totalling approximately $300 per
month, represents a 100% increase in his
obligation,3 notwithstanding the court's finding that a change in child support was not
warranted under the guidelines as a result in
income change.4
4.

Nunley suggests that this award is warranted
by the trial court's suspicions about Brooks's
income. While the court clearly expressed such
doubts, the court did so about both parties and
ultimately concluded that the findings it entered
represented its best estimate of their incomes.
Furthermore, the court's expressed suspicion
does not rise to the level of a "finding there were
special circumstances that justified deviation"
from the child support guidelines. Hill v. Hill,
841 P.2d 722. 724-25 (Utah App.1992).
Nunley also raises several arguments concerning the trial court's failure to impute additional
income to Brooks and to adjust his income because of its tax-free status. The court did not
mention the imputation of income in its order,
except to state that it believed both parties were
hiding income; however, it did note orally that it
did not agree with the other evidence Nunley
offered about underemployment and unemployment. Because we find these arguments to be
without merit, we decline to address them in

The trial court's rulings seem internally
inconsistent. If, as the court ruled, there has
been no material change in circumstances
justifying an increase in child support under
the guidelines, the court's only legal basis for
imposing an additional $300 monthly child
support obligation is a finding that "use of
the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate
or not in the best interest of [thel child."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2(3) (Supp.1994).
[4, 5] This inconsistent determination results from the trial court's incomplete analysis of material change in circumstances.
Factors other than a change in relative income affecting the child support calculation
can constitute a material change in circumstances allowing the court, on a modification
petition, to reach the issue of whether a
deviation from the guidelines is now appropriate. Significant changes in the factual
circumstances of the child, such as special
education or health needs, which, if in existence at the time of the original decree would
have permitted an upward deviation from the
guidelines allow a court to consider whether
to deviate from the guidelines in a modification proceeding. See Utah Code Ann. § 7845-7(3)(e) (Supp.1994) (upon finding sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines the
court shall consider all relevant factors, including the needs of the child, when establishing support).
Thus, we reverse and remand, rather than
merely vacate the private school tuition
award. We do so for several reasons. First,
neither the court nor the parties focused on
whether the facts presented as to Michelle's
special circumstances amounted to a substantial change of circumstances and thus justified a reassessment of whether an upward
deviation from the child support guidelines
was appropriate. Moreover, the record contains sufficient facts, although in dispute, to
support a substantial change in circumstances, and with appropriate findings; to
support an upward deviation from the child
support guidelines. Therefore, rather than
simply reversing the award of private school
fees, we reverse and remand for either the
entry of the requisite findings sufficient to
support an upward deviation from the child
detail. State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 889 (Utah

support guidelines, or the vacation oi the
award of ail past and future school-related
expenses.
[6J If the court enmihates the award of
prospective private school fees, it must also
vacate the awards of $9580 and $2900 representing one-half of various school-related
costs incurred during the period from November 21,1988 through September 16, 1991.
The award of these costs can be maintained
only if the trial court finds special circumstances allowing deviation from the guidelines and orders Brooks to pay one-half of
the private school expenses. In that event,
the court may reinstate, the private school
awards only back to the date Nunley filed
her amended petition and gave Brooks notice
of that petition. See Utah Code Ann. § 303-10.6(2) (Supp.1994) ("A child . . . support
order may be modified with respect to any
period during which a petition for modification is pending, but only from the date notice
of that petition was given...."); Kammersett i\ Kammersell 792 R2d 496, 497 n. 3
(Utah App.1990). In no event may the
award be retroactively increased beyond the
period during which the modification petition
was pending. See Karren v. Department of
Social Serv., 716 P.2d 810, 813 (Utah 1986)
(stating "only prospective modification of a
support obligation is proper"); Larsen v.
Larsen. 561 ?2d 1077, 1079 (Utah 1977)
("[A]limony and support payments . . . cannot be changed or modified after the installments have become due.")
B. Social Security Disability Benefits
and Child Support
[7] Brooks urged the trial court to offset
his child support obligation by the disability
dependent benefits Social Security pays to
Michelle due to his disability. In its April 26,
1991 ruling, the trial court did allow Brooks
to offset his share of the private school expenses by the amount of Social Security benefits Michelle receives. However, Nunley
submitted a motion for a post-trial determination of this issue, and after reconsideration
the court reversed its ruling. In its final
order, the court found:
1989).
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[The court] does not have the power to
assign the social security auxiliary benefits
received by the parties' minor child (by
reason of Defendant's permanent disability) to meet the Defendant's obligation to
pay one-half of the child's private-school
expenses. The social security auxiliary
benefits received by the minor child do not
reduce the disability benefits otherwise
due to or received by the Defendant and,
in fact, said auxiliary benefits are for the
minor child's use only and cannot be judicially assigned or designated for any other
use. The Court finds that the Defendant
should meet his obligations for one-half of
the minor child's private school expenses
from his own resources and not from the
child's social security benefits.
The court considered itself legally prohibited from allowing Brooks a credit against his
child support obligation for the disability
benefits Michelle receives. We thus review
the court's conclusion for correctness, giving
no special deference on appeal. Howell v.
Howell 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App.),
cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991).
Nunley asserts that the trial court did not
have the power to assign the Social Security
benefits to satisfy Brooks's obligation for private school costs. Nunley relies on a provision of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 407(a) (1988), to support her argument that
the court may not "assign or transfer the
minor child's Social Security benefits, received due to [Brooks's] disability, to satisfy
[his] obligation for payment of private schooling expenses." Section 407(a) provides:
The right of any person to any future
payment under this subchapter shall not
be transferable or assignable, at law or in
equity, and none of the moneys paid or
payable or rights existing under this subchapter shall be subject to execution, levy,
attachment, garnishment, or other legal
5. Numerous courts have rejected the use of Social Security disability and retirement benefits
towards child support arrearages. See, e.g., Kirwan v. Kirwan, 606 So.2d 771, 772-73 (Fla.Dist.
Ct.App.1992) (refusing to allow amount by which
child's monthly social security benefits exceeded
father's child support obligation to be used to
satisfy past arrearages); Jenerou v. Jenerou, 200
Mich.App. 265, 503 M.W.2d 744, 746 (1993) ("[A]
parent should not get credit against a child sup-

process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law.
Id. (emphasis added).
Nunley would have this court hold that
section 407 prohibits any sort of credit toward Brooks's child support obligation. That
is too broad a reading of section 407 and is
wholly inconsistent with Utah law. See Utah
Code Ann. § 7S-45-7.5(8)(b) (Supp.1994) (set
forth in full below). Rather, the correct
reading of section 407 is that it prevents the
trial coun irum ordering that the benefits
received on Michelle's behalf be spent for
some particular purpose. In other words,
the court may not subject those benefits to
any "legal process." See Fetterusso u State,
898 F.2d 322, 327-28, ajfa\ 898 F.2d 322 (2d
Cir.1990); Russo v. Russo, 1 ConnApp. 604,
474 A.2d 473, 476-77 (1984).
The parties' narrow characterization of the
issue obscures the true matter in controversy
on appeal: whether a court may consider a
child's receipt of Social Security benefits due
to a parent's disability as a credit against
that parent's child support obligation. This
is a question of first impression for this
court. However, the Legislature in formulating Utah's child support guidelines has
given courts such discretion. In part, section
78-45-7.5 provides:
Social Security benefits received by a child
due to the earnings of a parent may be
credited as child support to the parent
upon whose earning record it is based, by
crediting the amount against the potential
obligation of that parent
Utah Code Ann. § 78-4o-7.5(8)(b) (Supp.
1994). Moreover, most jurisdictions that
have considered this issue have allowed such
a credit.
Although reluctant to permit a parent
credit toward an arrearage,5 most courts
port arrearage merely because the child received
benefits from the federal government."); Mask v.
Mask, 95 N.M. 229, 620 P.2d 883, 885-86 (1980)
(prohibiting use of Social Security retirement
benefits toward arrearages accumulated before
benefits were received by the child); Fuller v.
Fuller, 49 Ohio App.2d 223. 360 N.E.2d 357,
358-59 (1976) (refusing to apply benefits to arrearages, resulting from violation of support obligation because to do so would be "ordering the
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have been willing to credit a parent's ongoing monthly support payments when the
child receives benefits directly. See generally Bruce I. McDaniel, Annotation, Right to
Credit on Child Support Payments for Social
Security or Other Government Dependency
Payments Made for Benefit of Child, 11
AX.R.3d 1315 (1977); accord Pontbriand v.
Pontbnana\ 622 A.2d 482, 484 (R.I.1993)
(u[T]he overwhelming majonty of states that
have considered this issue allow a credit for
Social Security benefits paid to dependent
children."). Courts that allow a credit follow
one of four approaches in determining whether to credit a disabled parent for benefits the
child receives. A court may: (1) in its discretion award a credit; (2) give credit only
when special requirements are met; (3) presume credit should be applied; or (4) grant a
credit as a matter of course. Cases which
exemplify these approaches include: Chase v.
Chase, 74 Wash.2d 253, 444 P.2d 145, 149
(1968) (allowing court in its discretion to
apply credit, but only by affirmative action);
Gerlich v. Gerlich, 379 N.W.2d 689, 691
(Minn.Ct.App. 1986) (allowing credit when receipt of benefits makes terms of original
order unfair or unreasonable); Children &
Youth Serv. v. Chorgo, 341 Pa.Super. 512, 491
A.2d 1374, 1378 (1985) (presuming credit is
appropriate absent showing to the contrary);
and Pontbriand, 622 A.2d at 485 (applying
automatic credit).
The relevant Utah statute, section 78-457.5(8)(b) of the Utah Code, quoted in its
entirety above, contemplates a discretionary
approach. That is the approach we now
adopt.6
The trial court should in its discretion consider these benefits because:
children to pay the accrued arrearages for their
own support").
These cases are distinguishable from the instant case because Brooks has no accrued arrearages. The amounts that the tnal court ordered him to pay for past private school expenses
do not constitute arrearages because Brooks was
not ordered to pay them until the entry of the
order at issue in this appeal In other words,
Brooks was not delinquent in satisfying his child
support obligation, instead, he was charged retroactive to the date of the amended petition for
the amount of the modification, pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 30-3-10 6(2) (Supp.1994).

Social security dependent disability benefits replace support the child loses upon
the disability of the wage earner response
ble for the child's support, and such benefits substitute for a parent's loss of earning
power and obligation to support his dependents. Thus, the source and the purpose
of social security dependent benefits are
identical to the source and purpose of child
support—both come from a noncustodial
parent's wages or assets and both provide
for the needs of the dependent child and
for our purposes, "no princip[led] distinction exists between social security benefits
and child support payments."
In re Marriage of Henry, 156 IU2d 541, 19Q
IlLDec. 773, 779, 622 N.E.2d 803, 809 (1993)
(citations omitted).
In conclusion, we hold that a trial court
may, in its discretion, consider a child's receipt of Social Security disability benefits and
allow a disabled parent credit for those benefits against the parent's child support obligation. We emphasize, however, that a trial
court may not order that those Social Security benefits be subject to legal process. See,
e.g., Philpott v Essex County Welfare Ba\f
409 U.S. 413, 417, 93 S.Ct 590, 592, 34
L.Ed.2d 608 (1973) (prohibiting use of legal
process to reach Social Security benefits);
Fetterusso, 898 F.2d at 327-28; Russo, 474
A.2d at 476-77. Thus, on remand, the court
is free to allow Brooks a credit against his
child support obligation for the benefits Michelle receives as a result of his disability.
II. VISITATION EXPENSE^
[8-10] In her cross-appeal, Ntinley attacks the entry of judgment against Ker for
one-half of the costs of transportation for
6.

Courts in several jurisdictions have adopted
this approach. See, e.g., Fowler v. Fowler, 156
Conn 569. 244 \ 2d 375, 377 (1968) (holding it
is '[w]ithm the sound discretion of the trial
court" to determine whether Social Security benefits may satisfy a child support obligation);
Mask, 620 P.2d at 885 (allowing credit "when
dictated by equitable considerations"); AfcAWf
v. Cofield, 78 Ohio App.3d 35, 603 N.E.2d4|ft
439 (1992) (stating "it may be equitable t o a J f w
the child support need by the amount of Sodal
Secunt> benefits received by the child").
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Brooks's visitation with Michelle from and
after the date she filed her amended petition
to modify the divorce decree. A modification
is proper when the moving party demonstrates a substantial change in circumstances
subsequent to the entry of the decree not
contemplated at that time. Muir v. Muir,
841 P.2d 736, 739 (Utah App.1992). This
court reviews a trial court's modification determination for an abuse of discretion. Hill
v. Hill 841 P.2d 722, 724 (Utah App.1992).
The California divorce decree required
Nunley to pay transportation costs for Michelle's travel between Salt Lake City and
Los Angeles to visit Brooks because Nunley
was employed by TWA Airlines. The California provision was predicated on the ease
and economy with which Nunley could procure airline tickets.

a deviation. On remand, the trial court is
free to consider the receipt of Social Security
dependent benefits as a credit to Brooks in
its calculations. Finally, we affirm the order
dividing equally the costs of transportation
for visitation.
JACKSON and ORME, JJ., concur.
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

The trial court concluded that a substantial
John SIMONETTE, Defendant
change in circumstances had occurred reand Appellant.
garding the payment of transportation exNo. 930361-CA.
penses, since Nunley no longer works for
TWA. We agree. Further, we cannot say
Court of Appeals of Utah.
the trial court abused its discretion in modifying the order to provide for an equal diviSept. 13. 1994.
sion of visitation costs. See Myers v. Myer^
768 P.2d 979 (Utah App.1989) (affirming trial
court judgment apportioning travel costs for
Defendant entered guilty plea in the
visitation with the noncustodial parent). We
therefore affirm the award apportioning the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Kencost of visitation equally between the parties. neth Rigtrup, J., to charges of attempted
forcible sexual abuse and was ordered to pay
restitution for treatment of both victim and
CONCLUSION7
her brother, whom defendant admitted havWe vacate the award of current and past ing physically abused. Defendant appealed.
private school costs. However, we remand The Court of Appeals, Bench, J., held that
for further consideration in light of our opin- defendant could be ordered to pay restitution
ion as to whether an upward deviation frorn for treatment costs for both victim and her
the child support guidelines to partially cover brother, even though defendant was not conthese costs is warranted. If the court deter- victed of any crime involving brother.
mines an upward deviation is warranted it
must make detailed findings supporting such
Affirmed.
7. Brooks has also challenged the thai court's
acceptance of certain pieces of documentary evj.
dence. submitted after trial, to substantiate Nunley's claim for one-half of the private school and
medical expenses already paid. He argues tha.t
the denials of his request for a hearing on the
issue were abuses of discretion. We have considered the arguments he raises and find them to
be without merit; accordingly, we do not tre^t
the issue. State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 889
(Utah 1989) (noting appellate court need ne>t
address meritless arguments).

Furthermore, because Brooks challenged the
award of past medical and dental expenses only
in this respect, we affirm the award of those
expenses. However, as discussed more fully in
Section LA. of this opinion, the award of past
medical and dental expenses may date back only
to the date of the filing of the amended petition
and no earlier. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6(2)
(Supp.1994); accord Kammersell v. Kammersell,
792 P.2d 496, 497 n. 3. (Utah App.1990).

1018

I'tah

X">S J W H r K

Alaska court's conclusion." Gale v. State,
792 P.2d 570, 588 (Wyo.1990); Jimenez v.
State, 105 Nev. 337, 775 P.2d 694, 697
(1989); State v. Gorton, 149 Vt. 602, 548
A.2d 419, 421 (1988); People v. Raibon, 843
P.2d 46, 49 (Colo.App. 1992). See e.g. State
v. Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 809 P.2d 455,
462 (1991) (concurring opinion); State v.
Spurgeon, 63 Wash.App. 503, 820 P.2d 960,
961-63 (1991); Williams v. State, 522 So.2d
201, 208 (Miss. 1988). Absent legislation or
precedent from the Utah Supreme Court,
we do not believe it would be appropriate to
require, by judicial fiat, that all statements
taken of a person in custody be recorded or
transcribed. Everette, 135 Ill.Dec. at 479,
543 N.E.2d at 1047.
Although, in accord with other courts,
we refrain from requiring recording of interrogations under the Utah Constitution,
we note several policy reasons for recording interrogations. These include avoiding
unwarranted claims of coercion and avoiding actual coercive tactics by police. In
addition, recording an interrogation may
show the "voluntariness of the confession,
the context in which a particular statement
was made, and . . . the actual content of
the statement." Williams, 522 So.2d at
208.
Miranda Warnings and the
Utah Constitution
Finally, defendant claims that regardless
of the evolution of voluntariness requirements under the federal constitution, the
Elstad doctrine should be rejected under
our state constitution.5 Defendant argues
that the state constitutional standard is
stricter than the federal constitution, and,
therefore, provides him greater protection.
Specifically, defendant urges us to reject
the federal interpretation of Miranda requirements as reflected in Elstad and other
cases, and retain what he regards as the
integrity of the Miranda decision as a matter of state law. Defendant also argues
5.

Article I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution provides
in relevant part that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law." Article I, § 12 of the Utah
Constitution provides, 'The accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself."

6.

Upon remand of Elstad by the United States
Supreme Court, the Oregon Court of Appeals

for extension of tne Miranda doctnrm K
means of the Utah Constitution.
[13,14] Although the state constitute
al issue was properly raised before the trial
court, we need not analyze and addrea*
every issue on appeal. State v. Carter
776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989). We ^
concerned that a separate state standard
might generate confusion in this area and
agree that "there is no value in being different merely for the sake of the differ.
ence." State i\ KelL 303 Or. *9 724 n^,
334, 336 (1987). Therefore, we decline ^
this time to develop a separate constitute
al standard governing admissibility of confessions under the Utah Constitution.1
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not err under the
United States or Utah Constitutions in denying defendant's motion to suppress his
post-Miranda confession. We therefore
affirm defendant's conviction.
ORME and GARFF, JJ.. concur.

Virginia B. HALL, Plaintiff
and Appellee,
v.
Blaine D. HALL, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 920052-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Aug. 10, 1993.
In divorce action, the Fourth District
Court, Utah County, George E. Ballif, J.,
ruled that "[w]e do not find, nor has defendant
identified, principles, precedents or criteria that
persuade us to adopt a different r u l e . . . .
'[where! unwarned questioning "did not abridge
respondent's constitutional privilege . . . but d*
parted only from the prophylactic standards later laid down by this Court in Miranda to safeguard that privilege."'" State v. Ebtaa\ 78 Or.
App. 362, 717 P.2d 174, 176 (1986) (citations
omitted).
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^tributed marital property between par;eS and imputed income to husband for
„arposes of calculating alimony and child
upport. rYusoancf appea/ecf. The Court of
appeals, Orme, J., held that: (1) trial court
, aS required to deduct wife's contribution
t of her inheritance from proceeds of
..je of marital home prior to dividing pro^eds between parties; (2) trial court's fail.re to make findings to effect that husband
s.lS voluntarily underemployed precluded
• nding that imputation of income to husan(j was proper; (3) trial court's failure to
make findings, explicit or implicit, concern,ng prevailing earnings for persons of simiar backgrounds to husband in community
v^fore calculating amount of income to imnute to husband was improper; and (4)
wjfe was not entitled to attorney fees on
appeal.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Divorce ®=*235, 252A
Court of Appeals accords trial court
v.nsuierable discretion in determining fi.ir.cial interests of divorced parties.
2. Divorce <s=»239, 253(4)
Trial court abuses its discretion in determining financial interests of divorced
parties when it fails to enter specific, derailed findings supporting its financial determinations; findings are adequate only if
they are sufficiently detailed and include
enough subsidiary facts to disclose steps
by which ultimate conclusion on each factual issue is reached.
3. Divorce <s=»252.5(l)
Trial court was required to divide proceeds from sale of marital home equally
after first subtracting amount necessary to
reimburse wife's contribution from her inheritence or to enter findings supporting
unequal distribution that resulted when
court first divided proceeds and then subtracted wife's contribution from husband's
half of proceeds; trial court made no findings as to any exceptional circumstances
which took case out of presumptive rule of
*qual distribution of marital property and
warranted repaying wife's inheritance SOle-

W»»«)

ly out of husband's portion of equity in
parties' home.
4. Divorce G=>253i2)
Once court makes finding that specific
item is marital property, law presumes that
it will be shared equally between parties
unless unusual circumstances, memoralized
in adequate findings, require otherwise.
5. Divorce <3=>239, 307
Trial court's decision to impute income
to husband tor purposes of child support
and alimony awards without making any
explicit finding that husband was underemployed or any subsidiary findings that
pointed to such determination having been
made implicitly was substantial departure
from procedure mandated by Legislature
and could not be justified merely as failure
to parrot exact language prescribed by
statute. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-10.2(2)(a), 7845-7.2(3), 78-45-7.5(7)(a).
a Divorce €=>3D7
Findings made by trial court regarding
amount of income to impute to party in
divorce action for purposes of child support
award do not become relevant until after
court determines, as threshold matter, that
income should be imputed because party is
Voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
U.C.A.1953, 78-45-7*.5(7)(a, b).
1. Parent and Child <3=3.3(6)
Findings on the whole are insufficient
if they omit critical findings required by
Statute governing imputation of income for
purpose of child support. U.C.A.1953, 7845-7.5(7Xa, b).
8. Divorce <3=>287, 312.7
Because evidence in divorce action was
hot clear, uncontroverted, and capable of
Supporting only finding in favor of judg>nent imputing income to husband for purhoses of determining child support and
Spousal support, trial court's decision to
impute income could not be affirmed on
basis of undisputed evidence in record;
parties hotly contested adequacy of husband's efforts to find more gainful employment and at least some evidence suggested
that husband's current, diminished income
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level resulted not from his personal preference or voluntary decisions, but instead
resulted from events beyond his control.
U.C.A.1953, 30-3-10.2(2)(a), 78-45-7.2(3),
78-45-7.5(7)(a, b).
9. Divorce <s=>286(2), 312.6(3)
Finding that husband was voluntarily
underemployed could not properly be implied in divorce action for purposes of determining child support and spousal support, even though trial court found that
husband was currently earning less than he
had previously earned, inasmuch as there
were no subsidiary findings showing that
trial court actually found that person with
husband's abilities could be earning more
in relevant market. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-10.2(2)(a), 78-45-7.2(3), 78-45~7.5(7)(a, b).
10. Divorce <s=>287, 312.7
Even given controverted evidence,
Court of Appeals could affirm trial court's
decision to impute income to spouse in divorce action for purposes of child support
and spousal support, absent outright expression of statutorily mandated finding, if
absent findings can reasonably be implied;
unstated findings can be implied if it is
reasonable to assume that trial court actually considered controverted evidence and
necessarily made finding to resolve controversy, but simply failed to record factual
determination it made. U.C.A.1953, 30-310.2(2)(a), 78-45-7.2(3), 78-45-7.5(7)(a, b).
11. Divorce <s=239, 307
Where court formulates detailed subsidiary findings of fact which underlie finding of underemployment for purposes of
imputing income to party in divorce action
on basis of which child support and spousal
support are determined, and which, by
themselves, show steps by which court arrived at its apparent conclusion that party
was underemployed, court's decision to impute income will not be invalidated solely
on ground that finding of voluntary underemployment was not couched in exact language of statute; this is especially true
since finding on ultimate issue of voluntary
underemployment is in reality more like
legal conclusion and is more meaningfully
made if supported by underlying findings

of historical fact. U.C.A.1953, .i0-o-i0.2(2)(a), 76-45-7.2(3), 78-45-7.5(7)(a, b).
12. Trial <3=>395(1)
In many cases, where court fails to
phrase findings in exact language of statute, findings nevertheless reflect methodical and extensively detailed treatment of
facts, which is often more insightful and
helpful on appeal than shorter, more cursory recitation of exact statutory language
would be; such approach frequently promotes more meaningful appellate review
by providing appellate court with insight
into steps taken by trial court in arriving at
its decision.
13. Appeal and Error <s=931(3)
Findings may not be implied when an
ambiguity of facts make such assumption
unreasonable.
14. Divorce <S=>239, 307
Trial court's failure to make findings,
explicit or implicit concerning prevailing
earnings for persons in community with
similar backgrounds to husband in order to
correctly fix amount of income to impute to
husband for purposes of child support, assuming propriety of so imputing income to
husband, was improper, even though husband's unique position as independent computer consultant, trained in unusual computer language, might render meaningful
comparison of husband's income with that
of other computer programmer/analysts
difficult; Court of Appeals could not disregard statutory mandate to make such findings solely on basis of litigant's unique
circumstances.
U.C.A.1953,
78-457.5<7)(b).
15. Divorce <s*237, 306
Statute applicable in calculating imputed income for purposes of determining
child support and spousal support in divorce action did not require comparison
with persons of exactly same background
to determine amount of imputed income,
but court was to evaluate earnings with
persons of similar backgrounds; thus, with
respect to husband in unique position as
independent consultant, trained in unusual

HALL v. HALL
Cite a* 858 P~2d 1018 (Utah App 1993)
computer

language, at minimum, trial
court was required to undertake some effort to evaluate employment market for
computer programmers/analysts in general and then make its best effort to adjust
for husband's unique skills. U.C.A.1953,
78^45-7.5(7)(b).
16. Divorce 0=287, 312.7
If on remand trial court finds that
husband was voluntarily underemployed, it
was then required to make findings as to
prevailing earnings for persons of background similar to that of husband in determining amount of income to impute to husband for purposes of child support and
spousal support awards. U.C.A.1953, 7845-7.5(7)(a, b).
17. Divorce <£=>224
Award of attorney fees to wife in divorce action was proper, where wife had
jeeal custody of all nine minor children, one
of whom was autistic and required extra
attention, and wife presently had no training or experience which would allow her to
work outside home.
18. Divorce <s=3225
Wife was not entitled to attorney fees
on husband's appeal from trial court's decision in divorce action, where except for
comparatively minor issues, husband prevailed on major issues in dispute and secured remand and reconsideration of issues.
19. Costs <3=*252
When appeal involves multiple issues,
party receiving attorney fees below need
not prevail on every issue in order to be
awarded fees on appeal.

Richard M. Hutchins, Provo, for defendant and appellant.
Craig M. Snyder and Leslie W. Slaugh,
Provo, for plaintiff and appellee.
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and ORME,
JJ.
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ORME, Judge:
Appellant, Blaine Hall, appeals, inter
alia, the trial court's order distributing
marital property between the parties and
imputing income to appellant for purposes
of calculating alimony and child support.
We reverse for lack of adequate findings
and remand.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] This court accords the trial court
considerable discretion in determining the
financial interests of divorced parties.
Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah
App.1990). Although "the court's 'actions
are entitled to a presumption of validity,' "
id. (quoting Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P. 2d
1055, 1056 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 765
P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987)), we cannot affirm
its determination when the trial court abuses its discretion. Allred, 797 P.2d at 1111.
The trial court abuses its discretion when it
fails to enter specific, detailed findings supporting its financial determinations. See
id. Findings are adequate only if they are
"sufficiently detailed and include enough
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Id. (quoting Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah
App. 1988)). See also Sukin v. Sukin, 842
P.2d 922, 924 (Utah App.1992) (detailed
findings are necessary to determine whether trial court has exercised its discretion in
a rational manner).
Appellant raises a number of issues on
appeal, some of which have no merit and
require no discussion. Accordingly, we see
no reason to engage in exhaustive treatment of the facts surrounding the parties'
divorce. We recite only the pertinent facts
in the course of treating the issues that
have merit.
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION
[3] During their marriage, the parties
constructed a home in Alpine, Utah. Prior
to or during the construction of the home,
appellee, Virginia Hall, received from her
father's estate a total of $21,000. Of this
sum, $6,000 was used as a down payment
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on the home, and an additional $15,000 was
contributed toward its construction.1 During the divorce proceedings, the marital
home was sold. After payment of the existing mortgage obligation, real estate commissions, and other costs of sale, the parties realized a total of $52,403.88 in net
equity from the sale of the home. As is
typical, the trial court ordered that the net
proceeds be divided equally between the
parties.2 The court then deducted from
appellant's share certain late fees and delinquent interest in the amount of $192.60.
Next, without explanation or explicit recognition that appellant's separate funds were
being used to reimburse appellee's contribution to the marital estate, the trial court
ordered that $21,000 of the remainder of
appellant's share of the equity be applied to
reimburse appellee the funds from her inheritance which were used in the purchase
and construction of the parties' home. Appellant was therefore left with net proceeds of approximately $5,000,3 and appellee received approximately $47,000.
Appellant claims the trial court abused
its discretion in ordering that appellee's
inheritance be reimbursed solely from his
portion of the equity in the home. Rather,
appellant argues, the trial court should
have returned appellee's inheritance of
$21,000 from the total equity of approximately $52,000, and then distributed the
remainder of the equity equally between
the parties. Appellee's contribution of her
separate funds to the marital estate would
thereby be repaid from the marital estate,
and each party would have then been presumptively entitled to half of the approximately $31,000 remaining home equity, or
roughly $15,500.
[4] In Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166
(Utah App.1990), this court observed that

trial courts must distribute propertv*^
tween the parties to a divorce in a &»
systematic fashion. See id. at 1172 ft '
10. The Burt court noted that the tiki
court should "first properly categorize H*
parties' property as part of the marim
estate or as the separate property of &&&
the other. Each party is presumed t<f U
entitled to all of his or her separate prW r
ty and fifty percent of the marital prop^
ty." Id. at 1172 The Burt court conur
ued:
But rather than simply enter such £*$£
cree [automatically], the court should
then consider the existence of exceptibjL
al circumstances and, if any be shoW
proceed to effect an equitable distrflnt.
tion in light of those circumstances.
Id. Thus, under Burt, once a court niaJces
a finding that a specific item is marital
property, the law presumes that it will be
shared equally between the parties unless
unusual circumstances, memorialized in adequate findings, require otherwise. See
also Watson i\ Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah
App.1992) ipremarital property and inheritances are viewed as separate property,
and, normally, equity requires that each
party retain the separate property brought
to the marriage).
While conceding that the trial court'*
property division did not result in an equal
division of the equity, appellee claims tilt
trial court was not obligated to distribute
the equity in the home equally. See New*
meyer v. Netomeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1279&
1 (Utah 1987) ("In determining wh&hefk
certain division of property is equitable, .. .the relative abilities of the spouses to sapport themselves after the divorce are pertinent to an equitable . . . division of the
fixed assets of the marriage."). Appellee

1. The testimony of appellee and her mother
established the separate nature of these funds.
Appellant does not dispute the separate nature
of the funds, nor does he claim that any commingling of these funds with the marital estate
destroyed their separate nature.

fact, the approximate net equity was $52,741.52.
After subtracting $592.26, which was applied
toward payment of a delinquent water bill, the
court was left with $52,149.26, which it divided
equally between the parties.

2. The proceeds from the sale of the parties'
home were deposited into a trust account which
accrued interest at the rate of $3.67 per day. At
the time the trial court entered its findings of

3. Appellant received exactly $4,832.03 after *»•
paying" $21,000 to appellee. The net amount
due him was applied in full to his delinquent
child support and alimony.

Cite as 858 ? 2d

intends that in reimbursing her inheritance from appellant's share of the equity,
he trial court took into account her special
.jrcumstances, i.e., her lack of education
nd work experience, and the fact that the
eeds of the parties' autistic child and two
,re-school age children precluded appellee
from seeking employment outside the
home. Appellant counters that these concerns were abundantly addressed by means
,r* ,:hild support and an award of permant.nt alimony.
We recognize the power of the trial court
to effect an equitable distribution of property by considering both parties' "contributions during the marriage and their circumstances at the time of the divorce." Id. at
1278. However, as this court held in Burt,
"the court's division of the estate cannot
stand undisturbed when we are not presented with sufficient findings to demonstrate that the court's ruling comports with
established law." 799 P.2d at 1172.
From all that appears, the court made a
simple conceptual error in providing for the
repayment of appellee's inheritance. The
trial court made no findings as to any
exceDtional circumstances which took this
case out of the presumptive rule of Burt
and warranted repaying appellee's inheritance solely out of appellant's portion of
the equity in the parties' home. Such an
unequal distribution of the parties' marital
property makes no sense in the absence of
findings justifying the decision, see Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 68 (Utah App.
1991), cert denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah
1992), especially since appellee did not seek
this result on any particular basis and
where appellee's lack of education and the
special needs of the children do appear to
have been thoroughly dealt with in the
award of permanent alimony and child support, which we do not disturb. Absent
findings that would justify departure from
the presumptive rule of equal distribution,
we reverse and remand to give the trial
4. During the divorce proceedings, the trial court
also received evidence as to the deposits made
by appellant to his credit union account in Los
Angeles, California. That account balance totalled approximately $96,000 in 1990.
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judge an opportunity to enter findings supporting the unequal distribution, or, in the
alternative, to divide the proceeds from the
sale of the home equally after first subtracting the amount necessary to reimburse appellee's contribution. See Burt,
799 P.2d at 1170, 1172.
IMPUTATION OF INCOME
Several years ago, while employed in the
computer business in California, appellant
earned a salary of $55,000. Appellant later
found employment in Utah as a computer
consultant and software developer and
worked in that capacity for at least the last
three years of the parties' marriage. Appellant's gross earnings listed on his income tax returns for 1988, 1989, and 1990
averaged in excess of $100,000 per year,
with average monthly gross earnings in
excess of $8,500.4
About ten days before trial, appellant
started a new job in Vancouver, Washington, at a salary of $40,000 per year. At
trial, appellant requested that the court's
child support and alimony determinations
be based on his current $40,000 per year
income level rather than on his historical
income of approximately $100,000 per
year.5 On the basis of the evidence introduced at trial as to appellant's income, and
noting the marked disparity between appellant's $40,000 salary at the time of trial and
his income over the last three years of his
marriage, the trial court concluded that the
only way to accurately gauge appellant's
income for purposes of determining his
support obligations was to rely on the historical earnings of appellant.
The court adopted rather detailed findings of fact based on the evidence adduced
at trial, which established that appellant's
average historical income over the three
and one half years prior to trial amounted
to $98,498.75 per year, with a monthly average gross income of $8,208.21.
5. Interestingly, in proposed findings submitted
to the court just a few days before trial, appellant included a finding stating he had an income of $66,000 per year.
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Appellant challenges the trial court's rulings regarding his child support and alimony obligations insofar as the trial court
based these obligations on appellant's historical income rather than on his income at
the time of trial. Appellant's primary argument in this regard is that the trial court
erred in imputing income to him without
explicitly determining that he was voluntarily unemployed or underemployed as required under Utah Code Ann. § 78-457.5(7)(a) (1992). Additionally, he makes a
subsidiary claim that in fixing the amount
of income to be imputed to appellant, the
trial court failed to follow statutory directives in assessing his "employment potential and probable earnings" as required
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7)(b)
(1992).
A. Propriety of Imputation
[5] In order to evaluate the merit of
appellant's first imputation argument, we
must determine whether the trial court's
decision to impute income was supported
by adequate findings in light of Utah Code
Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7)<a) (1992), which reads:
"Income may not be imputed to a parent
unless"the parent stipulates to the amount
imputed or a hearing is held and a finding
made that the parent is voluntarily unem"pToyed or underemployed."6
While we agree with appellee that section (7)(a) does not specifically require a
trial court, in making a "finding" of underemployment, to parrot the exact language
of the statute, it is well established that
where a statute expressly requires a trial
court to make a threshold finding before
taking specified judicial action, the trial
court abuses its discretion if it proceeds
without first making the legislatively mandated finding. See Hill v. Hill, 841 P.2d
722, 724-25 (Utah App.1992) (court abused
its discretion by departing from child support guidelines without first finding that
following the guidelines would be unjust,
6. Although in briefing, appellant seems to have
claimed the trial court erred in failing to hold a
separate hearing limited to determining appellant's income for purposes of imputing income
pursuant to section 78-45-7.5(7)(a), he conceded at oral argument that holding such a

.^K;:^

inappropriate or not in best interest of the
child as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78^
45-7.2(3) (1992)); Thronson v. TkronsoS
810 P.2d 428, 433 (Utah App.) (court abus<$
its discretion by awarding joint legal custo^
dy without first determining that both parents agreed to the order as required by
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2(2)(a) (1989)),
cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). A
careful review of the trial court's findings
reveals not only the absence of any explicit
finding that appellant was underemployed,
but also a lack of subsidiary findings that
point to such a determination having been
implicitly made. Thus, the court's aj£
proach cannot be justified merely as a failure to parrot the exact language prescribed
by the statute, but is instead a substantial
departure from the procedure mandated by
the Legislature.
[6] The court's decision is by no means
devoid of detailed factual findings. Indeed,
the trial court entered commendably detailed findings concerning appellant's historical income, his present income, and his
occupational qualifications. However, the
extensive detail apparent in the court's
findings of fact was pertinent to factors
required under section 78-45-7.5(7)(b)—the
section detailing factors to consider in arriving at the amount of income to impute.
The findings made by the trial court regarding the amount of income to impute,
per section (7Kb), do not become relevant
until after it determines, as a threshold
matter, that income should be imputed.because the parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, as required by
section (7)(a). We do know from the findings that appellant now earns considerably
less than he has in the recent past. We
can only guess at whether this state of
affairs stems from appellant's volition or,
as he contends, from the simple fact that
his once-coveted computer expertise in a
narrow field of business has been rendered
hearing in a case like the instant one would be
pointless. We note that in Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472. 480 (Utah App. 1991), this
court upheld the trial court's imputation of income to the wife despite the trial court's failure
to hold a separate hearing on the matter.
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[9-12] Furthermore, even given controverted evidence, we could affirm the trial
court's decision to impute income, absent
[7] The fact that the trial court entered outright expression of the statutorily manfindings required by section (7)(b) does not dated finding, if the absent findings can
alter the fact that the trial court failed to reasonably be implied. Unstated findings
can be implied if it is reasonable to assume
en ter any findings required under section
.-^a). TVJjndings ^n thfi ^vrHp are insuf- that the trial court actually considered the
ficient if_^hey__-flrnit critical findings re- Controverted evidence and necessarily
<<uxed by^"the statute. Allred v. Alfred, made a finding to resolve the controversy,
- ^ 7 - p ^ r T n ) 8 . 1111 (Utah App.1990). See but simply failed to record the factual dealso Jeffries v. Jeffries, 752 P.2d 909, 911 termination "it made. "See State v. Ra(Utah App.1988). Because the findings be- mirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787-88 n. 6 (Utah
fore ns donot include anv findings to the 1991). See also Adams v. Board of Re-^grFthat^ppellant was voluntarily under- view, 821 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App.1991) ("A
employed, they are statutorily insufficient. finding may be implied if it is clear from
the record, and therefore apparent upon
[8] The trial court's decision to impute review, that the finding was actually made
income may nonetheless be affirmed if the as part of the tribunal's decision."). Thus,
failure to have made the missing findings where the court formulates detailed subsidcan be viewed as harmless error. One i a r y finding nf fa^t whwh underlie a findmethod is to show that "the undisputed ing of underemployment, and which, by
evidence clearly establishes the factor or themselves, show rho <*tpps hv whirh the
factors on which findings are missing." court arrived at its apparent conclusion
Allred. 797 P.2d at 1111. In the case be- that a parent is underemployed under secfore us, at least some evidence suggests tion 78-45-7.5(7)(a), the court's decision to
chat appellant's current, diminished income impTTfelncom
validated aolelv
level resulted not from his personal prefer- on the ground that the ''finding" of volunence or voluntary decisions, but instead "lary underemployment wa* not, <*nnphPiLin
resulted from events beyond his control. the exact language of the statute. This is
For example, appellant claims his clients especially true since a "finding" on the
did not renew lucrative consulting con- ultimate issue of voluntary underemploytracts, and apparently the only job opportu- ment is in reality more like a legal conclunity available to him was the job he eventu- sion and is more meaningfully made if supally accepted at $40,000 per year. More- ported by underlying findings of historical
over, the parties hotly contest the adequacy fact.7
of appellant's efforts to find more gainful
employment. Accordingly, because the evi[13] Findings may not be implied, howdence in this case is not "clear, uncontro- ever, when the "ambiguity of the facts"
verted, and capable of supporting only a makes such an assumption unreasonable.
finding in favor of the judgment," we can- Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 788. This court r e
not affirm on the basis of undisputed evi- cently held that we will not imply any
dence in the record. Kinkella v. Baugh, missing finding where there is a "matrix of
660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983).
possible factual findings" and we cannot
a]l but obsolete by changes in industry and
technology.

7. In many cases, where a court fails to phrase
findings in the exact language of the statute, the
findings nevertheless reflect methodical and extensively detailed treatment of the facts, which
is often more insightful and helpful on appeal
than a shorter, more cursory recitation of the
exact statutory language would have been.
Such an approach frequently promotes more
meaningful appellate review by providing the
appellate court with insight into the steps taken

by the trial court in arriving at its decision. Cf.
LaSal Oil Co. v. Department of Envtl. Quality,
843 P.2d 1045, 1047-48 (Utah App. 1992) (contrasting commendable detail of findings made
by administrative law judge with sparse, conclusory findings made by department head and
remanding for more adequate findings "to more
fully articulate" reasons for department head's
decision).
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ascertain the tnal court's actual findings.
See Adams, 821 P.2d at 6.
A-finding that appellant was voluntarily
underemployed cannot properly be implied
in this case. Although the trial "cmirt
found that appellant is currently earning
less than he was previously, that isolated
finding does not answer the critical question of whether the drop in earnings was
voluntary.
Rather, appellant's current
earnings, as compared to his historical income, is merely one element in the matrix
of factual issues affecting the ultimate
finding of whether appellant is underemployed. Many critical questions are left
unanswered: What are appellant's abilities? Is appellant's current salary below
the prevailing market for a person with his
abilities? Are there any job openings for a
person with appellant's abilities? At a minimum, the trial court must determine appellant's employment capacity and earnings
potential—which it failed to do even in its
determination of the amount to impute under section (7)(b)—before it could logically
conclude that he is, in fact, underemployed.
Inasmuch as there are no subsidiary findings showing that the trial court actually
found that a person with appellant's abilities could be earning more in the relevant
market, we cannot imply a finding that
appellant is underemployed. We accordingly reverse the trial court's determination that appellant is underemployed and
remand for evaluation of that issue and the
entry of appropriate findings.
B. Amount of Imputed Income
[14] Appellant additionally argues that
even assuming the propriety of imputing
additional income to him, the trial court
incorrectly fixed the amount of income to
impute as set forth in Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-45-7.5(7)(b) (1992). That section provides that "[i]f income is imputed to a
parent, the income shall be based upon
employment potential and probable earn8. Appellant contends his once-lucrative market
niche has been lost due to the ability of his
former customers to now do the work he had
previously done using their own employees. Indeed, a company would be unlikely to expend
extravagant amounts for independent consult-

ings as derived from work history, occupy
tion qualifications, and prevailing earning
for persons of similar backgrounds in tf$
community." Id. Appellant specifically
assigns error to the court's failure to acfe
quately address "employment potential and
probable earnings." Id. The point is well
made.
As previously noted, the trial court made
elaborate underlying findings regarding appellant's work history and prior earnings
based on tax returns and bank records, and
occupational qualifications, based on ,h||
employment history. Yet the court made
no findings, explicit or implicit, concerning
"prevailing earnings for persons of similajp
backgrounds in the community" as required by section (7)(b).
[15] Although appellant's unique pogj.
tion as an independent consultant, trained
in an unusual computer language, might
render meaningful comparison of appellant's income with that of other computer
programmer/analysts difficult, we cannot
disregard a statutory mandate solely on
the basis of a litigant's unique circumstances. The statute does not require a
comparison with persons of exactly the
same background, but instructs courts to
evaluate earnings "for persons of similar
backgrounds."
/d. (emphasis added).
While an abundance of independent programmers might not inhabit the local market, surely computer programmers in diverse positions must be employed locally
under circumstances which would permit
some level of meaningful comparison. "If
an adequate pool of consultant programmer/analysts cannot be discovered, employee programmers who engage in similar programming activities might provide a useful
comparison.8 At a minimum, the trial
court must undertake some effort to evaluate the employment market for programmers in general, and then make its best
ing services if it could utilize in-house program*
mers to accomplish the same goals less expea-;
sively. If appellant's premise is sound, employee programmers may well prove to be the only
reliable reference point.
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to adjust tor appellant's unique
effort
.kills.
116] Accordingly, if upon remand the
ial court finds that appellant was volun* rily underemployed, it must then make
findings as to prevailing earnings for persons of backgrounds similar to that of appellant, as required by section (7)(b), in
;ttermining the amount of income to im-

ATTORNEY FEES
[L7] Despite the fact that appellee has
legal custody of all nine minor children, one
0f whom is autistic and requires extra attention, and despite the fact that she presently has no training or experience which
would allow her to work outside the home,
appellant argues that the court failed to
make sufficient factual findings to support
as award of attorney fees to appellee. We
include appellant's challenge to the trial
court's award of attorney fees among those
previously characterized as being without
-p.erit and accordingly leave the award undisturbed.
[18,19] Appellee, on the other hand,
claims she is entitled to attorney fees on
ippeal. ''Generally, when the trial court
awards fees in a domestic action to the
party who then substantially prevails on
appeal, fees will also be awarded to that
party on appeal/' Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831
P.2d 1027, 1031 (Utah App. 1992). See also
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah
App. 1990). When an appeal involves multiple issues, the party receiving attorney
fees below need not prevail on every issue
in order to be awarded fees on appeal. See
Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494 (Utah App.
1991) (party who ''prevailed on the main
issue on appeal" received fees); Ostler v.
Ostler, 789 P.2d 713, 717 (Utah App.1990)
t party prevailing on child support issue, but
losing on issue of dividing retirement account with nominal value, received fees).
In contrast to the instant case, Bell, Lyngle, and Ostler were all situations where
the party seeking attorney fees on appeal
prevailed on the most significant issues in
controversy. Here, except for the compar-
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atively minor issues we dismissed out of
hand, appettaitf, prevailed on the m^^r issues in dispute. He secured remand and
reconsideration of both the home equity
distribution and the imputation of income.
Appellee therefore is not entitled to attorney fees related to this appeal.
CONCLUSION
In allocating equity in the parties' home,
the trial court failed to make adequate
findings to justify its departure from the
presumptive rule of equal distribution of
property. We further agree with appellant
that the court erred by not making the
statutorily mandated findings that he was
underemployed as a prerequisite to its decision to impute income to appellant. If
upon remand for the forgoing issues, the
court adheres to its decision to impute income to appellant, it must consider "prevailing earnings for persons of similar
backgrounds in the community" in setting
the amount to impute. Finally, we leave
undisturbed the trial court's award of attorney fees to appellee, but refuse to
award fees to her for this appeal. We
accordingly reverse and remand for further
findings consistent with this opinion.
BENCH and BILLINGS, JJ., concur.

f KlYNUMBi* SYSTEM>

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Eugene MONTOYA, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 920441-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Aug. 12, 1993.
Defendant entered conditional plea of
no contest in the Third District Court, Salt
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Barbara HILL, Plaintiff and Appellee,
<teve HILL, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 920669-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Feb. 4, 1994.
Parties sought divorce. The First District Court. Cache County, Gordon J. Low,
j entered decree of divorce, and husband
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J-, held that: (1) trial court did not
abuse its discretion in imputing income to
husband of $2,000 per month; (2) alimony
award of $100 per month was reasonable; (3)
trial court properly allocated all dependency
exemptions to wife; and (4) wife was entitled
ro attorney fees and costs on appeal.
Affirmed.
Onne, J., concurred in the result.
1. Divorce O=»306
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in
imputing income to husband of $2,000 per
month, for purposes of fixing child support
obligations: trial couit took into account husband's last three years of employment at
$2,400 per month and his current employment at $6.90 per hour along with his income
from substitute teaching, and trial court noted that husband's decision to quit his higher
paying job was made without regard for financial impact on wife and their five children.
U.CA1953, 78-45-7.5(5)(c), (6).
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es to his financial condition, evidencing cornplete understanding of resources available to
pay alimony.
3. Divorce <^237
In making alimony award, trial court
must consider financial condition and needs
of party seeking alimony, that party's ability
to produce sufficient income for him or herself, and ability of other party to provide
support; failure to consider these factors
constitutes abuse of discretion.
4. Divorce <3=>308
Trial court properly allocated all dependency income tax exemptions to wife, who
was custodial parent; given wife's limited
financial resources and potential, trial court
determined that it would be best to allocate
all dependency exemptions to her. 26
U.S.CA. § 152.
5. Divorce <£=>224, 287
Wife was entitled to award of attorney
fees and costs on appeal, subject to trial
court's determination on remand that she is
in continued need of financial assistance, that
requested fees are reasonable, and that husband has ability to pay the award; wife wTas
awarded partial attorney fees by trial court
and she substantially prevailed on appeal.

Shelden R. Carter, Brook J. Sessions (argued), Carter, Phillips & Wilkinson, Provo,
for defendant and appellant.
Lyle W. Hilly ard (argued), Hilly ard,
Anderson & Olsen, Logan, for plaintiff and
appellee.
Before GREENWOOD, ORME and
RUSSON, JJ.

2. Divorce e=*240(l)
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that husband was able to pay
$100 per month in alimony, although husband
claimed that he only grossed $1,100 per
month and was required to pay almost $600
in child support, $100 in alimony, $200 towards loan and $200 for board and lodging;
husband's income was imputed at $2,000 per
month, and trial court made several referenc-

Steve Hill appeals from the provisions of
the trial court's decree of divorce regarding
child support obligations, alimony, debt dis-

'This opinion replaces the opinion of the same
name issued December 29, 1993. The sole

change is the addition of section E. "Attorney
Fees on Appeal."

AMENDED OPINION UPON
REHEARING
GREENWOOD, Judge:

trinutiun and Hie ngnt :<> cicui.. :,a .;-jprr.- mur.\ oi .}i»nj per muntn «tu u^ reexamined 4n
dency exemptions. We affirm.
two years), (3) child support of $597 per
month based upon Mr. Hill's imputed income
FACTS
of $2000 per month and Ms. Hill's imputed
Steve and Barbara Hill were married on income of $1040 per month, and (4) the right
July 23, 1976. The couple had five children to claim all fwe children as dependents for
over the course of the marriage, ranging in income tax purposes, although Mr. Hill could
age from five to fifteen as of the date of the claim them by paying Ms. Hill an amount
equal to the increase in her taxes resulting
divorce hearing.
from the loss of these dependency exempFor the last twelve years of the marriage, tions. In addition, the trial court split the
until July of 1991, Mr. Hill worked at Murton parties' debts as follows: (1) Mr. Hill is liable
Thiokol as a cab dziver. Due to the pay-cale for the EduServ student loan in the amount
at Thiokol as well as substantial overtime of $10,800, (2) Mr. Hill is Hable for the VISA
hours, Mr. Hill was earning approximately credit card debt at USU Credit Union in the
$2400 per month, a higher salary than his amount of $960, (3) the debt owed to Dr.
qualifications would ordinarily warrant. Joseph Hansen of approximately $167 is to
While working at Thiokol, Mr. Hill completed be paid $100 by Mr. Hill and $67 by Ms. Hill,
a bachelor's degree in business.
(4) Mr. Hill must pay $320 of the debt owed
Ms. Hill did not work outside the home to Dr. Johns, and Ms. Hill must pay $280, (5)
until after the parties separated in July of the parties are to split any deficiency claim
1991. For a short period of time she worked owed to the Federal National Mortgage Asfor Macey's grocery store, earning $6.00 per sociation, and (6) Mr. Hill must pay twohour. After leaving Macey's, Ms. Hill pro- thirds of the parties' combined attorney fees
vided daycare in her home and worked pan- of $6633. Mr. Hill appeals.
time for a printing company earning $6.50
per hour. Although she received some finanISSUES
cial support from Mr. Hill after the parties
Mr. Hill argues on appeal that (1) the trial
separated, Ms. Hill was unable to meet living
court made insufficient findings of fact to
expenses for herself and the children and
impute income to appellant for purposes of
required state assistance. At the time of the
the child support award and the alimony
divorce hearing, Ms. Hill was unemployed.
award, (2) the trial court made insufficient
Mr. Hill testified at trial that when the findings of fact to support an award of alimoparties separated, Ms. Hill asked him to ny, (3) the trial court abused its discretion by
leave the county, and it was understood that requiring that appellant pay the majority of
he would have to give up his job at Thiokol. the marital debts, and (4) the trial court
Ms. Hill testified that it was Mr. Hill's deci- abused its discretion by awarding to Ms. Hill
sion to leave Thiokol because he disliked his all five income tax dependency exemptions
job and wanted to enter a different field of for the parties' children.
work. Regardless of the basis for this decision, Mr. Hill moved to Orem to live with his
ANALYSIS
parents. He obtained employment at the
State Mental Hospital, earning $6.90 per
A. Imputation of Income
hour at the time of trial, and in addition did
[1] Child support obligations are fixed in
some substitute teaching. Mr. Hill also en- proportion to the adjusted gross incomes of
rolled in a one-year program, scheduled to the parents. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.7(1)
begin in the fall of 1993 at the Barrett Acade- (1992). Gross income is generally estabmy, where he hoped to obtain a certificate to lished by proof of current income. Id. § 78teach elementary school.
45-7.5(5)(b). However, the court may imThe pertinent parts of the September 9,
1992 divorce decree awarded Ms. Hill: (1)

pute gross income if it has first examined a
parent's historical and current earnings to
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ployment exists. Id. $ 78-45-7.5(5)(e), (6).
^;fhe court may not, however, impute income
to a parent for the purpose of determining
the appropriate level of child support unless
the parent either stipulates to the amount
imputed or there is a hearing in which the
Ending is made that the parent is voluntarily
unemployed or underemployed. Id. § 7845-7.5(7)(a). In this case, Mr. Hill did not
stipulate to the amount imputed, and he argues the trial court did not make the required finding that he is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.1 See Hall v. Hall
858 P.2d 1018, 1026 (Utah App.1993) (stating
that in determining whether to impute income due to underemployment, findingsjnust
'address "the critical question of whether the
drop in earnings was voluntary").
In fixing Mr. Hill's gross income, the trial
court took into account his last three years of
employment at $2400 per month and his current employment at $6.90 per hour along
with his income from substitute teaching.
Mr. Hill's attorney conceded at trial that an
imputation of income was proper but argued
that the monthly salary should be imputed at
51900—Mr. Hill's base monthly pay at Thiokol without overtime. The court recognized
that Mr. Hill was earning substantially less
money at his current job, but noted on the
record that Mr. Hill had voluntarily disregarded his familial obligations when he left
Thiokol to pursue a different career. The
court therefore imputed a salary of $2000 per
month to Mr. Hill—an amount greater than
his current salary, but less than his historical
earnings.

1^94,

to the proper income the court should impute. Mr. Hill also conceded during questioning that he was aware that his decision to
accept a lower paying job so that he could go
back to school had placed his family on welfare, and would keep them there until he got
a teaching position. He also agreed that
there were more menial jobs available in
Orem that would pay better than his current
job, but stated that he felt it was important
to select a job that was closer to his chosen
profession. Further, Mr. Hill thought it was
appropriate to impute a monthly income of
approximately $1000 to his wife, and agreed
that he has twice the earning capability of his
wife.
The trial court remarked several times
that Mr. Hill's decision to quit his Thiokol job
and pursue a new career was made without
regard for the financial impact on Ms. Hill
and their five children. In addition, the trial
court observed that the state's assistance
program was impacted by Mr. Hill's election
to change occupations. In light of these
discussions, we conclude that the trial court
implicitly found a condition of voluntary underemployment as a basis for imputing income to Mr. Hill. "Unstated findings can be
implied if it is reasonable to assume that the
trial court actually considered the controverted evidence and necessarily made a finding
to resolve the controversy, but simply failed
to record the factual determination it made."
Hall 858 P.2d at 1025. As this court noted
in Hall

While it is true that the court's findings of
fact do not include a specific finding that Mr.
Hill was underemployed, his counsel brought
this statutory requirement to the court's attention at the beginning of trial and the
record reveals that the court discussed the
issue of voluntary underemployment with
Mr. Hill at length. Furthermore, as noted
earlier, Mr. Hill conceded that income imputation was appropriate, thereby conceding
that he was underemployed, arguing only as

[WJhgTJ3 thp pnnrt. formulates detailed subsidiary findings of fact whirh nnderlje a
finding of underemployment, and ™h"»h, hy
thgmselves. show the stepfl by which the
court arrived at its apparent conclusion
that a parent is underemployed undpr section 78-45-7.5(7)(a), the court's decision to
impute income will not be invalidated solely on the ground that the "finding" of
^voluntary underemployment was noT
couched in the exact language of the statute.
~~

1. Mr. Hill also argues that even if he were voluntarily underemployed, it is improper to impute
income to him because he is "a parent engaged
in career or occupational training to establish
basic job skills." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-

7.5(7)(d)(iii) (1992). The trial court held that Mr.
Hill did not fit within this statute because he
already had a bachelor's degree, and was pursuing further education. We find no error in the
court's holding.

i)*io
Id. Therefore, because Mr. Hiii acquiesced
to the imputation of income at the trial level
and because Mr. Hill's job history and current employment options inarguably support
this imputation, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in imputing income to Mr. Hill
of $2000 per month.
B. Alimony
[2] The trial court initially awarded Ms.
Hill $300 per month in alimony based upon
findings concerning the long-term nature of
the marriage and the fact that Ms. Hill's
earning potential was roughly one-half of Mr.
Hill's earning potential. The court then reduced the alimony award to $100 per month
and compensated for the decrease by awarding responsibility for Ms. Hill's half of the
EduServ loan to Mr. Hill. The court recognized that Mr. Hill's financial situation would
probably change in the near future, and
therefore set the matter for further automatic hearing in two years to revisit the matter
of alimony.
[3] There are three factors that a trial
court must consider in making an alimony
award:
1. the financial condition and needs of the
party seeking alimony;
2. that party's ability to produce sufficient income for him or herself; and
3. the ability of the other party to provide
support.
Thronson v. Tkronson, 810 P.2d 428, 435
(Utah App.) (citing Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751
P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah App.1988)), cert denied 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). Failure to
consider these factors constitutes an abuse of
discretion. Id.
Mr. Hill does not dispute the court's findings with respect to the first and second
factors governing alimony awards. Instead,
he argues that the court did not make the
requisite findings on the third factor, his
ability to provide support. Mr. Hill points
out that he only grosses $1100 per month,
and out of this amount he must pay almost
$600 in child support, $100 in alimony, $200
towards the Eduserv loan and $200 to his
parents for board and lodging. In light of
his financial condition, Mr. Hill contends that

the euiat anusea its discretion in awarding
alimony to Ms. Hill.
Ms. Hill concedes that the court did not
make an express finding on Mr. Hill's ability
to pay, but notes that the court fully considered this factor at trial. Mr. Hill provided
the court with documentation concerning his
present and historical earnings, along with
his current expenses. The court made several references to Mr. Hill's financial condition,
evidencing a complete understanding of the
resources available zo pay alimony. The trial
court determined that Mr. Hill had voluntarily opted to be in his current financial condition and the court in making the alimony
award, was not bound by Mr. Hill's decision.
By imputing income of $2000 per month, the
trial court implicitly made a finding regarding Mr. Hill's ability to pay alimony, namely,
that he was able to pay $100 per month in
alimony. That determination was therefore
reasonable, given the remainder of the
court's orders regarding the parties' financial
obligations and the court did not abuse its
discretion in making this determination.
C. .Allocation of Debt
Mr. Hill claims that the court abused its
discretion wrhen it allocated the marital debts
so that Mr. Hill was responsible for approximately 87% of the debt and Ms. Hill was left
with only 13% of the debt. Mr. Hill argues
that given the trial court's finding that he
was capable of making twice as much money
as Ms. Hill, the trial court should have allocated the debts in a two-to-one ratio.
Mr. Hill's argument is meritless. The majority of the debts were divided in a two-toone ratio. Part of the reason Mr. Hill ended
up with 81% of the debt is that he improperly
included the entire EduServ loan in his calculations of the debt assigned to him. Ms.
Hill's half of the EduServ debt became Mr.
Hill's responsibility only upon a corresponding reduction in his alimony obligation. It is
therefore misleading to think of it as routine
debt distribution. In addition, Mr. Hill was
allocated the entire VISA debt ($960) because he had earlier taken a marital asset (a
$1416 check from Thiokol for early retirement benefits) and applied it solely for his
own use.
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gle i\ Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Utah
App.1992)). Ms. Hill was awarded partial
attorney fees by the trial court, and it is
conceded that she substantially prevailed on
appeal. We therefore award attorney fees
and costs on appeal, subject to the trial
court's determination on remand that Ms.
Hill is in continued need of financial assistance, that the requested fees are reasonable,
and that Mr. Hill has the ability to pay the
award. Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736, 741
•Utah App.1992). The trial court should also
take into account the fact that Ms. Hill was
only granted partial attorney fees at trial.
Potter, 845 P.2d at 275.

[4] The trial court awarded to Ms. Hill
the right to claim aJJ five children as income
tax dependents. However, Mr. Hill was permitted to purchase this right by paying for
Ms. Hiirs corresponding increase in taxes
caused by the loss of the dependency exemptions. Mr. Hill challenges that decision, arguing that by awarding him some of the
exemptions, the trial court could have "freed
up more of Mr. Hill's income to meet his
substantial burdens incurred as a result of
the marriage."
Pursuant to Internal Revenue Code § 152,
the custodial parent is automatically entitled
to the available dependency exemptions unless he or she "signs a written declaration
CONCLUSION
... that such custodial parent will not claim
such child as a dependent" and "the noncusAlthough the trial court did not make all
todial parent attaches such written declara- the express findings required before imputtion to [his or her] return." 26 U.S.C. ing income to Mr. Hill or determining alimo§ 152(e)(2) (1988). However, this court held ny, the record reveals that the trial court
in Motes v. Motes, 786 P.2d 232 (Utah App. considered the required factors in the course
1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah of deciding these issues, and its decision was
1990), that section 152 does not mandate that within the legitimate exercise of the court's
a state court grant all available exemptions discretion. With respect to debt distribution
to the custodial parent. l± at 236. "[S]tate and allocation of tax exemptions, Mr. Hill
courts do retain their traditional authority to was unable to establish that the trial court's
allocate dependency exemptions notwith- order was so inequitable as to constitute an
standing [section 152(e)(2) ]." Id.
abuse of discretion. In the absence of such a
showing,
there is no basis upon which to
Nonetheless, in this case, given Ms. Hill's
reverse
the
trial court's order. We affirm,
limited financial resources and potential, the
and
remand
this
matter to the trial court for
trial court determined that it would be best
a
determination
of reasonable attorney fees
to allocate all the dependency exemptions to
and
costs
incurred
on appeal.
her. While Mr. Hill objects to this decision,
he has not established by case law or legal
analysis that the trial court has abused its
RUSSON, J., concurs.
discretion, particularly in light of the fact
that the trial court's order permits him to
ORME, J., I concur, except that as to
purchase the dependency exemptions from Section D I concur only in the result.
Ms. Hill. For this reason, there is no basis
for disturbing the presumption of validity
attaching to the trial court's order.
E. Attorney Fees and Costs on Appeal
[5] Ms. Hill requests an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal. " 'Generally,
when the trial court awards fees in a domestic action to the party who substantially prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to
that party on appeal.'" Potter v. Potter, 845
P.2d 272, 275 (Utah App.1993) (quoting Lyn-

( O | HY NUMBER SYSTEM >

